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Abstract
We undertake the analysis of primary elections from 1980 through 1996 using both
academic individual level survey data, media exit-polls, and aggregate election returns
on a county by county basis. We come to the following conclusions:
1. there is very little crossover voting in general in United States primaries;
2. the dierence in the amount of crossover voting between states with
open primaries and closed primaries is not substantively large;
3. the amount of strategic behavior on the part of voters is extremely small.
Analysis of Crossover and Strategic Voting
R. Michael Alvarez Jonathan Nagler
1 Introduction
1.1 Strategic voting
In general, whether voters in democratic systems are \rational" has long been under
debate in the academic literature. One of the central points of contention has been
whether the Riker and Ordeshook (1968) \calculus of voting" is sound empirically (e.g.
Green and Shapiro 1994; Aldrich 1993; Jackman 1993). There, the voter is assumed to
calculate the costs and benets of voting and to vote for the candidate bringing them
the highest benets with the least cost.
But, when the theoretical \calculus of voting" model was extended to multiparty or
multicandidate elections by McKelvey and Ordeshook (1972), the theoretical rationale for
another form of rational behavior became quite clear. For the McKelvey and Ordeshook
model demonstrated that in a multiparty or multicandidate election, a voter might be
willing to vote for her second most preferred party if the more preferred party is unlikely
to win and if there is a close contest between the second and third ranked parties. This
rational behavior goes by many labels, called strategic, tactical, or sophisticated voting
behavior (we will refer to this behavior as strategic voting in this discussion).
Obviously, this sort of strategic behavior by voters was not noticed rst by McKelvey
and Ordeshook. But because of the obsession of much of the political behavior literature
on modeling two{party or two{candidate elections in the United States, strategic behavior
was largely ignored by most researchers until the late 1970's and early 1980's. Two
political developments fueled the rising interest in strategic voting research. One was the
rise of multi{candidate presidential primary contests in the United States following the
post{1968 reforms in the nomination processes in both of the major political parties. In
some of these primary struggles, there were at least a half of a dozen candidates in each
party primary; the fact that there were multiple viable candidates opened the door for
strategic behavior by primary voters (Abramson et al. 1992; Bartels 1985).
The second development was the rise of third{party or third{candidate challengers
in the United States and in the United Kingdom (Cain 1978; Galbriath and Rae 1989;
Heath et al. 1991; Johnston and Pattie 1991; Niemi et al. 1992). In the United Kingdom,
though, the sustained revival of the Liberal Party since 1970, the rise of nationalist
parties in Wales and Scotland, and the new Social Democratic Party, pointed signicant
challenges to the established two{party system. However, the rising importance of these
new or resurgent parties in British politics actually seemed to work to the advantage of
the Conservatives in the early 1980's. This led to explicit attempts by political leaders,
by the popular press, and by political pundits to persuade voters to cast strategic votes
in order to defeat the Conservative party in the 1987 general election (Galbraith and Rae
1989).
Since these developments, a number of researchers have attempted to estimate the
amount of strategic voting in a number of dierent countries and types of elections. All of
the estimates which we have found in the academic literature are summarized in Table 1.
There we show that the estimated amount of strategic voting varies from 3.6% (1983
UK) to 17.0% (1987 UK). What accounts for the amount of variation in these estimates
of strategic voting?
Table 1: Published estimates of strategic voting
Study Election Estimate of strategic voting
Johnston and Pattie (1991) 1983 UK 3.6%
Johnston and Pattie (1991) 1987 UK 5.8&
Blais and Nadeau (1996) 1988 Canada 6.0%
Evans and Heath (1993) 1987 UK 6.3%
Heath et al. (1991) 1987 UK 6.5%
Alvarez and Nagler (1997) 1987 UK 7.2%
Heath and Evans (1994) 1992 UK 9.0%
Galbraith and Rae (1989) 1987 UK 10-12%
Abramson et al. (1992) 1988 US S.T. Dem. 13%
Abramson et al. (1992) 1988 US S.T. Rep. 12.7-13.9%
Cain (1978) 1970 UK 14.6%
Niemi et al. (1993) 1987 UK 17.0%
Many of the estimates in this table suer from one of two important methodological
aws. The rst is the reliance by many of these studies on aggregate election returns to
estimate the extent of strategic voting. Some researchers use aggregate electoral data to
attempt a direct constituency{by{constituency estimate of strategic voting (Cain 1978),
while others look at shifts in vote shares between pairs of elections in dierent types of
constituencies (Spaord 1972; Curtice and Steed 1988; Galbraith and Rae 1989; Johnston
and Pattie 1991). Others have simply examined the support for minority parties in
dierent political systems (plurality versus proportional representation systems) to infer
the presence of strategic voting.
These studies all suer from an obvious and problematic aw. They all are using ag-
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gregated electoral data to infer individual{level preferences and expectations about the
probabilities of various parties winning elections. In broader terms, these researchers are
testing individual{level political theories with macro{level electoral data | producing
exactly the \ecological inference" problem which has received much attention in the writ-
ing of prominent political methodologists in recent years (e.g. Achen and Shively 1995;
King 1997). It is commonly known that estimates about individual behavior produced
using aggregated data are often incorrect (King 1997). Thus, we must be very suspicious
of estimates of an individual{level behavior like strategic voting produced using aggregate
electoral data.
The other aw suered by many of these studies is that they use reports of survey
respondents about the motivations for their voting behavior well after the election (Heath
et al. 1991; Niemi et al. 1992; Evans and Heath 1993). For example, in the 1987 British
general election survey, respondents were asked to state the main reason they voted for
the party they chose | one of the three response options was \I really preferred another
Party but it had no chance of winning in this constituency."
These questions, in particular those in the 1987 British survey data, have been used
quite widely in the literature on strategic voting. In fact, Niemi et al. (1992) use this
survey question, and a subsequent open{ended question asking for the reasons a re-
spondent cast the ballot they reported, to develop three dierent measures of strategic
voting. Unfortunately researchers using these survey questions do not appear to have
seriously considered the quality of the survey responses obtained for questions asking
for justications of reported political behavior. In fact, there has been a serious debate
in the American electoral behavior literature recently about the quality of post{election
questions probing the respondent's vote (Wright 1990, 1992); this work has found that
there is a strong bias towards reporting a vote for winning candidates the further the
interview is from the election. In our work, we have shown that there is a postelection
bias in favor of nding increased levels of strategic voting the further the interview is
conducted from election day (Alvarez and Nagler 1997). This eect is particularly strong
in the open{ended method of measurement, since we see clear increases in each successive
postelection month in the reported percentage of strategic voting. For respondents inter-
viewed six months after the election were over twice as likely as respondents interviewed
one month after the election to report strategic voting. For many of these self{reports are
not really strategic voting, but misreporting of vote biased towards the winner|which
is observationally equivalent to reporting a strategic vote.
In the end, we believe that our approach for measuring strategic voting is more ac-
curate than that previously advanced in the literature. First, we begin with a more
consistent model of sincere voting in multiparty democratic systems than has been pre-
sented in the literature to date. Second, we use a new operationalization of the objective
strategic setting. We take advantage of the electoral structure of British elections that
allows for cross{constituency variance in the likelihood of strategic voting. In this section
of the paper we discuss both these advances, and then conclude by discussing the specic
expectations we have of our model's predictions. We use a well{specied model of voter
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decisionmaking and we incorporate objective estimates (based on the past performance
of each party in a particular electoral district) of the probabilities of party success in the
electoral district. Using this methodology, we obtain an estimate of 7.2% strategic voting
in the 1987 British election, which is in the middle of the range of estimates in Table 1.
1.2 Crossover Voting in United States Primaries
This is a brief review of a brief literature. There is disagreement in the literature over
the denition of crossover voting. This disagreement centers on independent voters. As
much of the early literature was generated by a Democratic party platform rule that
explicitly grouped independent voters with Republicans, the early literature reected
that categorization in dening a crossover voter. We use the term \crossover voting" to
refer to when identiers of the opposing party vote in the primary (i.e., Republicans vote
in the Democratic primary or Democrats vote in the Republican primary).
Hedlund and Watts (1986) examined voting in Wisconsin primaries from 1968 to 1994.
The percentage of crossover voting they nd ranges from 2% to 14% in the Republican
primary, and 7% to 12% in the Democratic primary. The rate of independents crossing
over into either primary is quite large: from 28% to 44% of voters in the Republican
primary were Independents, from 30% to 45% of voters in the Democratic primary were
Independents.
Adamany (1976) performed a similar analysis for 1964 through 1972 in Wisconsin.
However, he reports dierent crossover rates using a dierent sample. According to
Adamany's data, the crossover rate as we have dened it (excluding Independents) ranged
from 3.7% to 14.1% in the Republican primary; and from 16.2% to 22.4% in the Demo-
cratic primary. The crossover rate of independents ranged from 9.7% in the Democratic
primary; and from 7.0% to 10.2% in the Republican primary.
1
Wekkin reanalyzed the data on Wisconsin for 1980, but considered whether Inde-
pendents reported to be \leaning" towards either the Democratic party or Republican
party. By considering the voting of the leaners, we can develop alternative views on how
to classify Independents. Wekkin found that if Republican leaners were categorized as
Republicans, and Democratic leaners were categorized as Democrats; then the crossover
rates would be 10.2% for the Democratic primary, and 22.4% for the Republican primary.
Additionally, some work on voting in United States primaries tries to analyze the
tendency of voters to exhibit the basic tenets of strategic behavior; that is, to cast a vote
for other than their rst-choice in the hopes of having the greatest chance of favorably
inuencing the nal election outcome towards the best possible outcome based on their
preferences. This behavior could be manifested two ways in Primaries. First, a voter
could pass over their rst choice in a primary if they feel their rst choice has no chance
1
We believe the discrepancy between Adamany's gures and Hedlund and Watts gures arises because
Adamany classies Independent-leaners as partisans.
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to win the primary; and attempt to vote for their second or third choice in the primary
rather than \waste" their vote. Second, a voter could realize that regardless of their rst
choice's chances in the primary, their rst choice would have no chance in the general
election; and they could vote for a candidate who is not their rst choice, but has a
better chance of winning the general election. This sort of voting has been described as
\positive strategic" (Southwell 1981).
Abramowitz, McGlennon and Rapoport (1981) examined voter behavior in the 1977
Virginia gubernatorial primary. There were two candidates, and the authors were trying
to determine if voters considered which candidate would have a better chance in the
general election when casting their vote in the primary. They found that fewer than 10%
were considering this.
A more recent attempt at exploring sophisticated voting in United States primaries
was undertaken by Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, and Rohde (1992). They examined the
voting behavior and possible motivation of voters in the 1988 Super Tuesday primaries.
They found that only one in seven voters could be classied as \apparently sophisticated."
In other words, the test of sophistication was weak - and this was the upper bound for
the number of voters who might have been behaving strategically.
Southwell (1981) examined the 1988 Super Tuesday primary to determine the amount
of \positive strategic" behavior, as well as the amount of raiding. She estimated that
as many as 18% of voters were positive strategic, and as many as 6% were raiders. She
found equal amounts of positive strategic voting in closed and open primaries.
Most disagreement in the literature on the amount of crossover voting is based simply
on disagreement over the denition of crossover voting. The literature seems to agree that
when speaking of strictly partisan crossover voting (as opposed to counting Independents
as crossovers), there is on the order of 10% crossover voting in primaries.
2 Basis of this Analysis
This analysis is based on publicly available survey data, and aggregate election returns
from several states.
The individual level analysis is based on the following surveys that are available from
the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research in Ann Arbor.
 1992 Voter Research and Surveys Presidential Primary Exit Polls
 1988 CBS/New York Times Super Tuesday Primary Election Exit Polls
 1988 CBS/New York Times Primary Election Exit Polls
 1988 American National Election Studies Super Tuesday Study
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 1984 CBS/New York Times Primary Election Exit Polls
 1980 American National Election Study
We analyze this data to determine the likelihood of voters to engage in: crossover
voting, strategic voting of a positive kind, and raiding.
First, we consider the amount of crossover voting likely to happen under an open
primary. This is of course the rst question; if there is no crossing-over, then the adoption
of an open primary has no impact.
We also examine whether there is more or less crossover voting in an open primary
than a closed primary. Crossover voting in a closed primary may sound like a logical
inconsistency: but many voters in closed Democratic primaries will profess to identify
with the Republican party when asked, and will vote for the Republican presidential
candidate in the general election. The same is true for many voters in closed Republican
primaries.
Second, we consider why these voters are crossing over. There are three reasons to
crossover:
 Sincere Voting: A Republican voter could feel that a Democratic candidate is the
best candidate available in the entire eld, and thus crossover to vote Democratic.
Such a voter is sincerely trying to insure that his or her most preferred candidate
has the opportunity to contest the general election.
 Second-Best Vote: A Republican voter could feel that the Republican primary is a
foregone conclusion; and rather than waste their vote on a Republican candidate,
they could try to insure that the Democratic candidate is the best available can-
didate from the lot. This would give the voter some `insurance' in the event of a
Democratic win in the general election.
 Raiding: A Republican voter could feel that the most important thing is to elect any
Republican; and think that the best way to do this is to insure that the Democrats
nominate the candidate that would be weakest in the general election. Such a voter
would vote in the Democratic primary for the Democratic candidate perceived to
be weakest in the general election. Such behavior presupposes a complex chain of
behavioral assumptions, and an unlikely set of election day realities. First, the voter
must choose to try to inuence the election by electing the most likely loser for the
`opposing' side; rather than try to elect the most likely winner from the home-team.
Second, the voter must have information (or beliefs) about the relative chances of
success of each candidate in the primary in a general election that is at least 4 or
5 months away.
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3 Complexity of Strategic Voting
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis of the incidence of strategic voting, we lay
out the reasons why it is unlikely to observe strategic voting in the context of United
States primary elections.
3.1 Second-Best Strategic Voting
This requires information about the likely outcome in at least one primary. Such infor-
mation might be available. For instance, in United States presidential elections, a sitting
incumbent president is generally regarded as almost a sure thing in his own party's pri-
mary. Thus for instance, a Democratic voter in 1996 might have felt that Bill Clinton
was certain to be the party's nominee. But uncertain of the general election outcome
between Clinton and the Republican nominee, the voter might have voted in the Repub-
lican primary for Steve Forbes because the voter preferred Forbes to all other Republican
candidates.
3.2 Strategic Raiding
Such behavior presupposes a complex chain of behavioral assumptions, and an unlikely
set of election day realities. First, the voter must choose to try to inuence the election
by electing the most likely loser for the `opposing' side; rather than try to elect the
most likely winner from the home-team. Second, the voter must have information (or
beliefs) about the relative chances of success of each candidate running in the primary
in a general election that is at least 4 or 5 months away. Such information is simply not
going to be available. Consider recent electoral history. In 1992 even after sewing up
the Democratic nomination, Bill Clinton was given little chances in the polls of winning
the general election. During the primary it became common wisdom that Clinton had
so much personal baggage that he would be a sure loser in a general election. So any
Republican voter attempting to strategically 'raid' the Democratic primary might have
been tempted to vote for Bill Clinton. But obviously this would not have secured the
objective.
One reliable piece of evidence we have that voters cannot know in advance the like-
lihood of a given candidate winning the general election is the documented change in
perceptions over time, and polls over the course of a campaign, of a given candidate's
chances. The Iowa Presidential Election Market oers us a reliable indicator of the in-
formed public's perceptions of the chances of any candidate winning nomination and the
general election.
2
That the prices for any candidate move over time is an indication that
2
The Iowa Presidential Election Market is a real money futures market run by the College of Business
Administration of the University of Iowa. The market is open to traders from anywhere in the world,
access is provided over the world wide web. Participants in the market buy nancial contracts, the value
of which are determined by the presidential election outcome.
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the public does not know who the most likely winner is. For instance, between January
and March of 1996 the price of a Bob Dole share for the Republican Primary uctuated
between 63 cents and 50 cents. There is even more uncertainty in the public's mind as to
the winner of the presidential election. The general public has no reason not to take the
latest published pole as the best predictor of the general election result. Yet the polls
show tremendous variability.
3.3 Elections Considered
The likelihood of crossover voting depends upon the available candidates. In the extreme
case, few voters are likely to crossover to vote in a primary with only one candidate.
Rather we expect crossover voting to depend upon two things: the choices available for
each party, and the relative competitiveness of each party's primary. Thus to establish
the likelihood of crossover voting it is important to consider crossover voting under many
dierent election scenarios.
We analyze the following cases:
 The 1992 presidential primary: Here the republican race was not considered com-
petitive, with George Bush running as an incumbent and only challenged by Pat
Buchanan; the Democratic race was extremely competitive for many states and
oered many choices.
 The 1988 presidential primary: here the Republican race was briey competitive
and the Democratic race was competitive.
 The 1984 presidential race: this oered a competitive Democratic primary, and a
completely uncompetitive Republican primary. This was an excellent opportunity
for Republican voters to crossover.
 The 1980 presidential primary: this race oered interesting primaries in both par-
ties; giving voters of both parties the temptation to crossover.
4 Cross Over Voting
4.1 Denition: Open vs. Closed Primaries
Most primaries in the United States are commonly classied in one of two categories:
open or closed.
In most states where voters declare their party preference when they register
to vote, 'closed' primaries are held; only voters registered with a particular
party are allowed to participate in that party's primary. Some states have
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modied this system and allow citizens who register as independent or state no
party preference when they register to select the party ballot of their choice.
Selecting a party ballot usually puts these voters on the registration rolls as
members of the party. In states without party registration, 'open' primaries
are held. Voters either choose a party ballot before they enter the polling
booth or in states where the Republican and Democratic primary races are
on the same ballot, voters may cast a ballot in either party primary once in
the polling booth.(McGillivray, 1993: vii)
We used McGillivray's classication of states in determining whether they had open or
closed primaries. Thus a closed primary is one in which only voters registered as party
members are eligible to cast ballots. An open primary is one in which voters are not
required to be registered as party members to cast ballots.
4.2 Denition: Crossover Voting
We consider a crossover voter to be when a Democratic voter votes in a Republican pri-
mary, or when a Republican voter votes in a Democratic primary. We do not consider
votes in either primary by independent voters to be crossover votes. We feel that any
denition of crossover voting that counts independents is not appropriate for American
politics, where an increasing number of voters now claim to be independents. The Amer-
ican National Election Studies has been asking respondents \Generally speaking, do you
consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" since 1952. In
the 1990s the percentage of respondents claiming to be Independent has been over 35%.
4.3 Measurement of Crossover Voting
To determine the dierence in the amount of crossover voting between open and closed
primaries we must rst nd a way to measure the amount of crossover voting in closed
primaries. This might seem like a contradiction: by denition the members of the Demo-
cratic party are not able to vote in a closed Republican primary, and members of the
Republican party are not able to vote in a closed Democratic party. However, party
\membership" is not really a useful concept in this case. Since people become party
\members" by the act of registering to vote, not by some voluntary act independent of
voting, party membership is not really what we want to know. In a closed party we
could observe that there are no \crossover" voters simply because the criteria we use to
assign someone to a party is observationally equivalent to their already having crossed
over. For instance, consider a state with closed primaries; and an electorate that has
not previously registered with either party, but is 50% Republican and 50% Democratic.
If in a given election 1 out of 5 Democratic voters chooses to vote in the Republican
primary we would register them as Republicans; and record that the electorate was 60%
Republican and 40% Democratic - with zero crossover voting. But this simply isn't right.
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So, what to do? Using aggregate data, we could observe the voting behavior over time
of individuals in a state to see how Democratic or how Republican they are. But with
available survey data, there is an easier and more direct method. A standard question on
both academic surveys and media exit polls of voters is designed to determine which, if
either, party the voter identies with. For instance, in 1992 Voter Research and Surveys
asked voters leaving the primary polling place \No matter how you voted today, do you
usually think of yourself as a: 1) Strong Democrat, 2) Not strong Democrat, 3) Strong
Republican, 4) Not strong Republican, 5) independent, 6) something else?"
If we look at the data for the 15 states with closed primaries where VRS was in
the eld, we see that 3% of voters in closed Democratic primaries claim to be Republican
identiers, and 1.9% of voters in closed Republican primaries claim to be Democratic
identiers.
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This data is presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Crossover voting: Self{reported party id in closed primaries (1992)
1992 - VRS: Closed Primary States
Cumulative Results
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's 2s
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
Total 15695 689 6712 286 11324 3489
Agg % 67.8 3.0 29.1 1.9 75.0 23.1

x%
9.2 1.6 9.2 0.7 7.3 7.5
Min % 44.1 1.4 15.1 0.5 58.7 14.8
Max % 83.3 7.0 51.3 2.9 82.9 39.1
Now for comparison purposes, lets look at the proportion of voters in open primaries
claiming to identify with the opposite party (Table 3). This is a clean measure of the
amount of crossover voting. Turning again to the VRS survey for 1992, we have data
for 12 states with open primaries. 5.3% of voters in open Democratic primaries reported
to be Republican identiers; and 4.2% of voters in Republican primaries claimed to be
Democratic identiers.
Now examining individual states we see that the range of crossover voting was not
very high (Tables 4 and 5. In the closed primary states the most crossover voting in
the Democratic primary was in Louisiana, 7%.
4
The least was Kansas with 1.4%. On
3
The Republican count is based on only 14 states.
4
Louisiana is well known for having a variant of a blanket primary for choosing most of its elected
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Table 3: Crossover voting: Self{reported party id in open primaries (1992)
1992 - VRS: Open Primary States
Cumulative Results
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
Total 9270 771 4598 482 7684 3402
Agg % 63.3 5.3 31.4 4.2 66.4 29.4

x%
5.1 1.9 4.4 2.1 4.3 2.7
Min % 53.7 1.6 23.5 1.2 57.3 25.3
Max % 68.9 7.8 39.2 8.7 72.3 34.0
the Republican side Connecticut had the greatest amount of crossover voting, only 2.9%;
and Oklahoma had the least, only 0.5%. In California, 2.0% of voters in the Democratic
primary claimed to be Republican identiers, and 1.4% of voters in the Republican
primary claimed to be Democratic identiers.
Looking at individual states with open primaries we can get some idea as to the
variance in crossover voting that dierent strategic situations can present (Table 6. Even
with open primaries, the highest reported amount of crossover voting in open Democratic
primaries is only 7.8%: in Mississippi 7.8% of voters in the Democratic primary claim to
identify with the Republican party. And in open Republican primaries the highest level
of Democratic identiers is in Georgia, where 8.7% of voters claim to identify with the
Republican party.
oÆcials. However, it uses a standard closed primary to choose its delegates to the national convention.
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Table 4: Crossover voting: Self{reported party id in closed primaries (1992)
1992 - VRS: Closed Primary States
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
State
California 1628 45 588 18 1030 239
72.0 2.0 26.0 1.4 80.0 18.6
Colorado 881 24 458 22 866 233
64.6 1.8 33.6 2.0 77.3 20.8
Connecticut 1178 32 474 28 775 169
70.0 1.9 28.2 2.9 79.7 17.4
Florida 1218 76 418 26 1129 298
71.1 4.4 24.4 1.8 77.7 20.5
Kansas 405 9 209 12 539 181
65.0 1.4 33.6 1.6 73.6 24.7
Louisiana 745 73 228 18 641 114
71.2 7.0 21.8 2.3 82.9 14.8
Massachusetts 678 35 587 21 551 367
52.2 2.7 45.2 2.2 58.7 39.1
Maryland 1449 90 458 26 999 213
72.6 4.5 22.9 2.1 80.7 17.2
North Carolina 1213 53 365 20 614 177
74.4 3.3 22.4 2.5 75.7 21.8
New Hampshire 815 85 949 29 1114 648
44.1 4.6 51.3 1.6 62.2 36.2
Continued in Table 5.
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Table 5: Crossover voting: Self{reported party id in closed primaries (1992)
1992 - VRS: Closed Primary States
Continued From Previous Page
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
State
New Jersey 561 21 284 6 446 181
64.8 2.4 32.8 1.0 70.5 28.6
New York 1167 34 470 { { {
69.8 2.0 28.1 { { {
Oklahoma 850 48 255 3 512 113
73.7 4.2 22.1 0.5 81.5 18.0
Oregon 884 19 423 14 592 245
66.7 1.4 32.0 1.7 69.6 28.8
Pennsylvania 1297 31 414 25 1013 219
74.5 1.8 23.8 2.0 80.6 17.4
South Dakota 726 14 132 18 503 92
83.3 1.6 15.1 2.9 82.1 15.0
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Of course to test further for the possibility of increased crossover voting under dierent
strategic or contextual possibilities it makes sense to look at dierent election years. Thus
for 1988 we examined both CBS/NY-Times exit poll data, and National Election Studies
surveys.
In the 6 states we have CBS/NY-Times exit poll data for that held closed primaries,
we again had little crossover voting. Only 2.8% of voters in closed Democratic primaries
claimed to be Republican identiers, and 3.0% of voters in closed Republican primaries
claimed to be Democratic identiers. This is shown in Table 7.
Demonstrating that context can matter, we saw signicantly more crossover voting
in open primaries in 1988 than 1992. In the 4 open primaries we have CBS/NY-Times
exit polls for 10.4% of voters in open Democratic primaries claimed to be Republican
identiers. In the 1 open Republican primary we have such exit poll data for, 6.8% of
voters claimed to be Democratic identiers (Table 8).
We see relatively little variance in crossover voting across the states with closed
primaries. There is large variance across the 4 states with open primaries: the
amount of crossover voting ranges from 2.9% (Ohio) to 20.5% (Indiana). This is shown
in Tables 9 and 10.
In 1984 we analyzed the CBS/New York Times exit poll data for Democratic primaries
in ve states with open primaries: Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, and Texas. This
was a perfect year to nd high amounts of strategic crossover voting by Republicans as
the Republican primary was of no interest (Ronald Reagan was unchallenged). Other
than local races, there was no reason to vote in the Republican primary. Yet in our ve
states, only 276 of 6213 voters in Democratic primaries surveyed (4.4%) claimed to be
Republican identiers. The highest crossover rate was in Georgia (7.2%), the lowest in
Texas (1.6%). The results are given in Tables 11 and 12.
In the three closed primary states we looked at for comparison purposes in 1984
(California, Pennsylvania, and New York), only 142 of 6352 voters surveyed (2.2%) in
the Democratic primary classied themselves as Republican identiers (Tables 12 and
13. So, the dierence in crossover voting between open and closed primaries, even in a
year that we expect to lead to large amounts of strategic voting, is only 2.2%.
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Table 6: Crossover voting: Self{reported party id in open primaries (1992)
1992 - VRS: Open Primary States
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
State
Alabama 556 68 353 8 233 103
56.9 7.0 36.1 2.3 67.7 29.9
Georgia 1011 73 402 119 780 462
68.0 4.9 27.1 8.7 57.3 34.0
Illinois 916 86 533 23 690 242
59.7 5.6 34.7 2.4 72.3 25.3
Indiana 489 18 203 21 390 167
68.9 2.5 28.6 3.6 67.5 28.9
Michigan 963 64 524 54 1018 376
62.1 4.1 33.8 3.7 70.3 26.0
Minnesota 688 37 32.5 26 447 213
65.5 3.5 31.0 3.8 65.2 31.1
Mississippi 696 79 238 51 470 223
68.7 7.8 23.5 6.9 63.2 30.0
Ohio 592 14 261 9 559 206
68.3 1.6 30.1 1.2 72.2 26.6
South Carolina 620 48 242 49 831 410
68.1 5.3 26.6 3.8 64.4 31.8
Tenn 646 49 286 35 582 225
65.9 5.0 29.2 4.2 69.1 26.7
Texas 1139 109 534 32 984 428
63.9 6.1 30.0 2.2 68.1 29.6
Wisconsin 954 126 697 55 700 347
53.7 7.1 39.2 5.0 63.5 31.5
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Table 7: Crossover Voting: Self{reported party id in closed primaries (1988)
1988 - CBS/NY-Times: Closed Primary States
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
Total 6996 255 1845 139 3281 1227
Agg % 76.9 2.8 20.3 3.0 70.6 26.4

x%
9.4 0.8 9.1 0.3 9.5 9.8
Min % 58.3 1.5 14.2 2.8 64.9 15.3
Max % 84.3 3.3 38.6 3.3 81.4 32.3
Table 8: Crossover voting: Self{reported party id in open primaries (1988)
1988 - CBS/NY-Times: Open Primary States
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
Total 4164 655 1482 63 635 229
Agg % 66.1 10.4 23.5 6.8 68.5 24.7

x%
10.6 8.1 8.8 - - -
Min % 53.5 2.9 12.8 - - -
Max % 79.1 20.5 32.9 - - -
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Table 9: Crossover voting: Self{reported party id in closed primaries (1988)
1988 - CBS/NY-Times: Closed Primary States
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
State
Iowa 1284 32 313 53 1305 245
78.8 2.0 19.2 3.3 81.4 15.3
New Hamp 845 45 559 43 988 491
58.3 3.1 38.6 2.8 64.9 32.3
New Jersey 900 37 224 - - -
77.5 3.2 19.3 - - -
New York 1605 62 292 - - -
81.9 3.2 14.9 - - -
Penn 1585 65 326 - - -
80.2 3.3 16.5 - - -
S. Dakota 777 14 131 43 988 491
84.3 1.5 14.2 2.8 64.9 32.3
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Table 10: Crossover voting: Self{reported party id in open primaries (1988)
1988 - CBS/NY-Times: Open Primary States
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
State
Illinois 1103 83 405 63 635 229
69.3 5.2 25.5 6.8 68.5 24.7
Indiana 847 260 163 - - -
66.7 20.5 12.8 - - -
Ohio 1157 42 264 - - -
79.1 2.9 18.1 - - -
Wisconsin 1057 270 650 - - -
53.5 13.7 32.9
Table 11: Crossover voting: Self{reported party id in open primaries (1984)
1984 - CBS/NY-Times: Open Primary States
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Cumulative Results
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
Total 4579 276 1358




Min % 69.0 1.6 14.5
Max % 83.9 7.2 27.0
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Table 12: Crossover voting: Self{reported party id in open primaries (1984)
1984 - CBS/NY-Times: Open Primary States
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
State
Alabama 917 78 238 - - -
74.4 6.3 19.3 - - -
Georgia 844 87 280 - - -
69.7 7.2 23.1 - - -
Illinois 822 48 321 - - -
69.0 4.0 27.0 - - -
Ohio 1088 46 362 - - -
72.7 3.1 24.2 - - -
Texas 908 17 157 - - -
83.9 1.6 14.5 - - -
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Table 13: Crossover voting: Self{reported party id in closed primaries (1984)
1984 - CBS: Closed Primary States
Cumulative Results
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
Total 5148 142 1062 { { {
Agg % 82.9 2.2 16.7 { { {

x%
0.9 1.1 0.3 { { {
Min % 80.2 0.9 16.4 { { {
Max % 82.1 3.0 17.0 { { {
We utilized a dierent survey to evaluate 1980. The National Election Study of 1980
included specic questions of voters about their behavior in the primary. The sample
is a national probability sample, rather than exit polls in particular states. The data
is presented in Table 14. Here we nd higher levels of crossover voting in both closed
and open states. In open primary states 16.4% of voters in the Democratic primary
identied themselves as Republicans, and 6.3% of voters in the Republican primary
identied themselves as Democrats. In closed primary states 15.4% of voters in the
Democratic primary identied themselves as Republicans, and 7.1% of voters in the
Republican primary identied themselves as Democrats.
We have examined a large number of elections because we think that the likelihood
of crossover voting depends upon the context of the election. The striking fact about our
analysis is how little crossover voting open primaries encourage versus closed primaries.
We summarize the amount of crossover voting in Table 15. Here we compare crossover
voting in open primary states to closed primary states for 1992, 1988, 1984, and 1980
for both Democratic and Republican primaries. In each year there is more crossover
voting in open primaries (except 1980 for the Republican primary). However, the
dierence is only substantively interesting in 1988 for the Democratic primary. In the
following section we turn to a more detailed analysis of 1988.
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Table 14: Crossover voting: self{reported party id in closed primaries (1984)
1984 - CBS: Closed Primary States
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
State
California 1929 72 403 - - -
80.2 3.0 16.8 - - -
New York 1626 18 336 - - -
82.1 0.9 17.0 - - -
Penn 1593 52 323 - - -
81.0 2.6 16.4 - - -
Table 15: Crossover voting: Self{reported party id in 1980)
Table 13 : Cross Over Voting
Self-Reported Party Id In 1980
1980 - NES: Open Primary States
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s Dem 2s Rep 2s Ind 2s
133 27 5 5 14 61
80.6 16.4 3.0 6.3 17.5 76.3
1980 - NES: Closed Primary States
Democratic Primary Republican Primary
Respondent's
Party-Id Dem Rep Ind Dem Rep Ind
83 16 5 6 23 56
79.8 15.4 4.8 7.1 27.1 65.9
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Table 16: Summary of Crossover voting: 1980{1992
Democratic Primaries Republican Primaries
Closed Open Closed Open
Year Primary Primary Primary Primary
1992 3.0 5.3 1.9 4.2
1988 2.8 10.4 3.0 6.8
1984 1.1 2.3 { {
1980 15.4 16.4 7.1 6.3
a
Table entries are the percentage of crossover voters in each primary.
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5 How Many Raiders?
While the amount of crossover voting necessarily puts an upper bound on the amount
of strategic behavior by voters, we still want to know the motivation of the crossover
voters. The most pernicious attempt at strategic voting would be for voters to attempt
to `interfere' and `sabotage' the primary of the other party by crossing over and voting in
the opposing party's primary in an attempt to give the other party the weakest general
election nominee. We looked for raiders in the 1988 Super Tuesday primaries. This is an
appropriate election to search for raiders because the requisite circumstances for raiding
were present: the Republican primary was largely a foregone conclusion in the minds of
most voters (George Bush was looking unbeatable), and the Democratic primary oered
a large selection of candidates - some of whom were probably not likely to be strong
candidates in a general election.
To determine if a crossover voter is attempting to act as a raider we need to know if
the voter is intentionally voting for a candidate that they perceive to be a loser in the
general election. Here are the requirements a voter had to meet for us to classify them
as a raider:
1. They had to crossover and vote in the primary of the party that they did not
identify with.
2. There had to be a candidate available in the primary they voted in whom they did
not vote for, and:
(a) Who they preferred to the candidate they did vote for, and
(b) Who they felt had a better chance of winning the general election than the
candidate they voted for.
3. They had to want the party they identied with to win the general election.
We thus need quite a lot of information about a voter's preferences regarding the
candidates, and the voter's beliefs about the relative likelihood of candidates winning the
general election. The National Election Study's 1988 \Super Tuesday Study" conducted
by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, was designed to
elicit this type of information from voters. The study consisted both of a pre-primary
questionnaire, and a post-primary interview that was administered to 1688 respondents.
719 of those respondents reported voting in a primary.
We determined whether a voter crossed over by comparing their self-reported par-
tisan identication to the primary they voted in. A voter who reported voting in the
Republican primary but claimed to identify with the Democratic primary was classied
as a crossover voter; as was a voter who reported voting in the Democratic primary but
claimed to identify with the Republican primary. To determine whether these crossover
voters had a more preferred candidate available to them, we utilized their responses to
the \Feeling Thermometer" questions the NES asked. The precise question asked was:
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Now let's talk about your feelings toward the people you know something
about. I'll read the name of a person and I will ask you to rate that person
on a thermometer that runs from 0 to 100 degrees. Ratings between 50
and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward that person.
Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel too favorable and
are cool toward that person. You may use any number from 0 to 100 to tell
me how favorable or unfavorable your feelings are for each person. If you
don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person, you would rate the
person at the 50 degree mark.
The rst person is XXXXXXXXXXX. How would you rate (him/her) using
this thermometer?
If a respondent listed one of the candidates in the primary they voted in as having a
higher thermometer score than the candidate they voted for, we considered them to be
potential raiders.
Raiding also requires the voter to consciously vote for a candidate they expect to have
little chance in the general election. Again, the National Election Study explicitly elicits
the respondents' opinion on this. Respondents were asked:
Now, thinking about general election to be held this November we'd like you
to tell us about some of the candidate's chances of winning the presidency
in 1988. As before, we will use a scale that runs from 0 to 100, where 0
represents no chance of winning the presidency, 50 represents an even chance,
and 100 represents certain victory.
Thus we can compare the respondents' explicit evaluation of the chances of the candi-
date he or she voted for with the chances of each of the other candidates available in the
same primary. If the respondent votes for a candidate that they both \feel less warmly"
about, and think has a lower chance of winning the general election, than another avail-
able candidate - then we cannot but think that their intention is to raid, not to insure
that each primary will produce a candidate they view favorably.
We provide results in Table 16. There, we see that the results are as follows: 97 of the
719 voters (13.5%) reported crossing over. However, of the 719 primary voters, only 557
of them were willing to assign feeling thermometer ratings to the candidate they voted
for. 65 of these 557 voters crossed over. 35 of the 291 (12.0%) voters in open primaries
(12.0%) crossed over, and 30 of the 266 voters (11.3%) in closed primaries crossed over.
Thus as we have consistently seen, the crossover rate is low. Of the 65 crossover voters,
9 reported motivations consistent with raiding! Of these, 4 were in open primaries, and
5 were in closed primaries.
We broke the crossover voters down further by motivation. We dened true sup-
porters as people who crossed over to vote for the candidate who they regarded as
the best option in either primary according to their feeling thermometer rankings. We
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dened second best voters as people who crossed over to vote for the best candidate
available in the primary they voted in, though their rst choice was available in their
own primary: these were people who presumably thought that their own primary was a
foregone conclusion; but wanted their most preferred candidate from the other primary
available as an alternative in the general election should their own party's candidate lose
in November. These are people looking for insurance. We dened positive strategic
voters as voters who crossed over to vote for a candidate presumably because they felt
their own primary was a foregone conclusion, and while they did not vote for their most
preferred alternative available in the primary they were voting in, there was no preferred
alternative with as high a perceived chance of winning the primary. Thus again, these
were voters who we felt were trying to get some insurance for the general election.
Of the 35 voters who crossed over in open primaries, 13 were true supporters -
voters crossing over because the grass was greener on the other side and they found their
favorite candidate there. 14 of these 35 crossover voters met our conditions for being
second best voters: they were voting for their preferred candidate in the primary they
were voting in. Of the 8 remaining voters, 3 were positive strategic, 4 were raiders,
and 1 did not t any of our categories.
Of the 30 voters who crossed over in closed primaries, 10 were true supporters. 11
were second best, 3 were positive strategic, 5 were raiders, and 1 was not classied
in any of our categories.
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Table 17: Motivation of 1988 Super Tuesday crossover voters
Open Closed
Primaries Primaries
True Supporters 13 10
28.6% 33.3%
4.5% 3.8%
Second Best 14 11
40% 36.7%
4.8% 4.1%









Total Crossover 35 30
Total Voters 291 266
a
The rst percentage for each category of voter is based on the number
of crossover voters; the second percentage in each category is based on
the number of primary voters.
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6 Conclusion of Individual Analysis
We have demonstrated that open primaries do not lead to a substantively large increase
in crossover voting over closed primaries. And we have argued that the existing literature
on voter behavior suggests that any crossover voting that occurs will be motivated by
voters' desire to vote for their rst-choice candidate, or, to a lesser extent, to avoid
wasting their vote. Voters will simply not have the information necessary to engage in
raiding behavior in primaries. We nd that our empirical analysis of the 1988 Super
Tuesday primary provides overwhelming evidence to support this claim. By carefully
examining the voters' evaluations of the available candidates, and the voters' perceptions
of the candidates' chances of winning both the primary and general election, we have
been able to demonstrate that fewer than 2% of voters in the primary engaged in raiding
behavior.
It is our view that the blanket primary will not lead to large amounts of strategic
behavior by voters. The possibility of strategic behavior in a primary is signicantly
dierent than in multi-candidate general elections.
7 Ecological Evidence for Crossover Voting
Thus far we have oered a considerable body of evidence which shows that the incidence
of crossover voting in open primaries is relatively low. Also we have shown that the
motivations for crossover voting at the individual voter level are usually not malicious;
in other words, we have found very little evidence for voter intentional \raiding" of the
opposing party's primary.
In this section of our report we turn to a dierent type of analysis of crossover vot-
ing. Here we examine not individual{level surveys of voters leaving the polling place
on election day, but instead we examine aggregated county{level statistics of primary
election outcomes in two states, Washington and Ohio.
5
Using the aggregated county{
level statistics provides us a dierent way to study the incidence of crossover voting in
open primary elections, thus providing additional validity to the individual{level studies
we have previously conducted. The analyses we report on in this section of our report
also allow us to extend our analysis of crossover voting to dierent types of primary
elections and importantly, to a state with a primary election institution which could be
quite similar to the type of open primary election which California has adopted after the
5
As we will explain in more detail below, there are three reasons we study these states. First,
Washington is an important case for our analysis, since it is a state which also has a blanket primary
| the same type of primary system which California has adopted with the passage of Proposition 198.
Second, Ohio is an open primary state, and therefore it will be useful for us to compare estimates of
crossover voting using aggregated electoral statistics from an open primary state to a blanket primary
state. Third, Ohio's primary requires voter registration, but any registered voter may cast a ballot in
either party's primary. This gives us excellent data on the partisan composition of each county.
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passage of Proposition 198 | the blanket primary system as it is employed in the state
of Washington.
Thus, more specically, we study the following primary elections using aggregated
county{level voting returns:
 Washington's 1992 Senate race.
 Washington's 1992 Gubernatorial race.
 Washington's 1996 Gubernatorial race.
 Washington's 1996 Lt. Governor race.
 Washington's 1996 Secretary of State race.
 Washington's 1996 Treasurer race.
 Washington's 1996 Insurance Commissioner race.
 Washington's 1996 Auditor race.
 Washington's 1996 Attorney General race.
 Washington's 1996 Commissioner of Public Land race.
 Ohio's 1992 Senate race.
 Ohio's 1994 Senate race.
 Ohio's 1994 Gubernatorial race.
We study all of these recent races in Washington and Ohio for a number of important
reasons.
1. Cross{validation. By examining aggregated electoral returns we obtain estimates
of crossover voting using dierent data and dierent statistical techniques. We
obtain estimates of the extent of crossover voting using the aggregated data which
are very similar to the estimates we obtained using the primary election exit polls
in the previous sections of our report. This greatly strengthens the validity of our
ndings in both sections of this report, allowing us to state much more strongly
that the incidence of crossover voting in open primary states is low.
6
2. Examination of sub{presidential primary races. Our studies of crossover vot-
ing using exit poll data were limited to only crossover as it related to presidential
primary elections. While presidential primary races are quite important and quite
visible elections, they are not the only races on primary ballots. There are many
6
See Stone 1974 on the importance of cross{validation.
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other types of races on primary ballots, ranging from state{wide races for promi-
nent seats like U.S. Senate and Gubernatorial seats, to other state{wide races for
positions of perhaps lesser electoral prominence, like the Secretary of State or the
State Treasurer. It is important to obtain estimates of the extent of voter crossover
in these sub{presidential races as well, so that we can determine if crossover is
greater or lesser in these sub{presidential elections.
3. Examination of crossover voting in blanket primaries. Thus far, our exit
poll analyses have been primary of crossover voting in open primary states. Un-
fortunately, the exit poll data we have used in the previous parts of our study do
not cover primary elections in the State of Washington, which is a state near to
California both culturally and politically. But most importantly, Washington has a
blanket primary system, which is the type of primary election institution which will
be adopted by California under Proposition 198. Thus by studying the aggregated
electoral data fromWashington we can better understand the incidence of crossover
voting in a blanket primary state and determine whether the incidence of crossover
voting is any dierent than in open primary states.
We begin our analysis of the aggregated electoral data by describing the methodology
of our analysis. We then turn to a discussion of the results we obtain in all of these
races. Our conclusion to this section contains a discussion of the general importance of
the results we obtain using the aggregated electoral statistics for the study of crossover
voting.
7.1 Methodology used to study crossover voting with aggre-
gated data
The data we use for this component of our study come from two dierent sources. The
data used for the 1992 and 1994 Senate and Gubernatorial primary elections in both
Ohio and Washington were taken directly from McGillivray (1993, 1995).
7
For our study
of the 1996 primary elections in Washington, the data for each of the eight state{wide
races we examine were provided by the Washington Secretary of State.
Our general approach is best summarized by example. In Table 18 the columns
give the percentage of Democratic (T) and Republican partisans (1-T) in a particular
county.
8
The rows give the percentage of votes cast for Democratic primary candidates
(X) and the percentage of votes cast for Republican primary candidates (1-X). We obtain
county{by{county gures for each of these percentages from the sources listed above.
7
Alice V. McGillivray, Congressional and Gubernatorial Primaries, 1991{1992: A Handbook of Elec-
tion Statistics, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1993; Alice V. McGillivray, Congressional
and Gubernatorial Primaries, 1993{1994: A Handbook of Election Statistics, Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Quarterly, 1995.
8
For the purposes of this example, we dene partisans as either identiers or those who are registered
in the particular party.
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Table 18: Crossover voting example
Percentage of Votes Percentage of Partisans
Democratic Republican
Democratic DS DC X
Republican RC RS 1 - X
T 1 - T
What we want to know, though, are the four unknown quantities in Table 18. Two
of these quantities are DS and RS, which are the percentage of Democratic identiers in
the county voting \straight" for Democratic primary candidates and the percentage of
Republican identiers in the county voting \straight" for Republican primary candidates.
These are not of interest in our discussion here. The other two quantities, though, are of
extreme interest to us. They are given by DC (the percentage of Democratic identiers
in the county voting \crossover" ballots for Republican primary candidates) and RC
(the percentage of Republican identiers in the county voting \crossover" ballots for
Democratic primary candidates).
Producing estimates of these quantities of interest, then, will entail the use of aggre-
gated data to make inferences about individual{level behavior. Producing estimates of
this sort has been called \ecological inference" in the social science and statistics liter-
ature, and has been the subject of considerable academic discussion for over 75 years.
Here we use the newly developed \generalized method of bounds" to produce estimates
of DC and RC from our county{level data (King 1997).
9
King's approach takes gen-
eralized the ecological inference models developed in the past 25 years (Claggett and
Van Wingen 1993; Duncan and Davis 1963; Dykstra 1986; Flanigan and Zingale 1985;
Kousser 1986; Shively (1974, 1991), and Sigelman (1991)) and produces a technique for
\ecological inference" which avoids the pitfalls of the previous approaches (King 1997).
Thus, armed with knowledge of the percentages of votes cast for Democratic and
Republican primary candidates in each county, and the percentages of Democratic and
Republican partisan identiers in each county, we can produce county{by{county esti-
mates of both Democratic and Republican crossover using King's \generalized method
of bounds." This is exactly what we do with the Ohio data from 1992 and 1994, since
under Ohio's open primary system we know exactly the number of votes cast and the
number of partisans in each county.
10
But under Washington's blanket primary system,
9
King denes an ecological inference: Ecological inference is the process of using aggregate (i.e.,
\ecological") data to infer discrete individual{level relationships of interest when individual{level data
are not available. Existing methods (before King's work) of ecological inference generate very inaccurate
conclusions about the empirical world|which thus gives rise to the ecological inference problem" (King
1997: p. xv). King's ecological inference technique has been used in one recent court case: William
Mallory et al. vs. State of Ohio, George V. Voinovich et al., U.S. District Court, Southern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division (Case Number C-2-95-381, Judge George C. Smith).
10
Ohio's open primary requires voter registration. Any registered voter may cast a ballot in either
party's primary, but local lists are maintained of each individual's voting history and crossover voters
have to sign forms.
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voter party registration is not required; hence we do not have county{by{county data of
party registration. Instead, we produce an estimate of the partisan composition of each
county by using the county average of the votes cast across all of the state{wide races in
that election year for which we have data.
11
7.2 Discussion of the results
We present our results in two dierent formats. In Table 19 we provide the state{wide
estimates of crossover voting in each of these races, beginning with Washington at the
top and Ohio at the bottom. These will be the focus of our discussion. We provide in
Tables 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 the county{by{county crossover voting estimates
which form the basis of the estimates in Table 19.
Table 19 is organized so that we give two average estimates of crossover voting for
each primary race | the rst estimate is the percentage of Republicans crossing over to
vote for Democratic primary candidates and the second is the percentage of Democrats
crossing over to vote for Republican primary candidates. The rst aspect of our discussion
of these results focuses on the general extent of crossover voting we estimate with the
ecological data. Notice that in only two cases do we estimate that 20% or more of
one party's voters crossover to vote for candidates of the opposing party: Republican
crossover in the Washington 1992 Senate race (20%) and Democratic crossover in the
Washington 1996 Secretary of State's race (24%). The rst election was for an open
Senate seat, formerly held by incumbent Democrat Brock Adams. On the Democratic
side, political{newcomer Patty Murray ran against a former U.S. House member Don
Bonker. There were three candidates in the Republican race, the best{known being a
U.S. House representative, Rod Chandler. Thus, it seems that some Republicans crossed
over to vote in the Democratic race between Murray and Bonker. The other race where
we nd considerable crossover voting is one in which there was only one Democratic and
one Republican candidate running in the primary (1996 Washington Secretary of State).
In the rest of the cases in Table 19 we nd that the amount of crossover voting 15%
or less, which indicates that there is not much crossover voting in this set of elections.
We also can discern no reliable patterns in this set of results. First, we do not see any
evidence that there is any systematic partisan dierence in the propensity to crossover |
Republicans seem just as likely to crossover as Democrats. This also implies that neither
party is disproportionately hurt by crossover voting. Second, we do not see that there
is much of a dierence between the most visible primary races in Ohio and Washington.
Thus, it does not seem that when it comes to the highly{visible races for gubernatorial or
U.S. Senate seats that the blanket primary leads to a greater incidence of crossover voting
than an open primary. Third, we see that crossover voting not more likely in highly{
visible races than it is in less{visible state government positions. In the 1996 Washington
11
This means that we use the county average vote in 1996 across all of the eight state{wide races and
the same average in 1992 for the two state{wide races. This is one way to measure the baseline partisan
division in a geographic location when survey data are unavailable.
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Table 19: Ecological Crossover Voting Estimates, Ohio and Washington
County Standard
State Race Crossover Average Deviation Counties
Washington 1992 Governor Republican .09 .04 39
Washington 1992 Governor Democratic .17 .02 39
Washington 1992 Senate Republican .20 .08 39
Washington 1992 Senate Democratic .04 .006 39
Washington 1996 Governor Republican .15 .05 39
Washington 1996 Governor Democratic .19 .006 39
Washington 1996 Lt. Governor Republican .18 .03 39
Washington 1996 Lt. Governor Democratic .10 .03 39
Washington 1996 Sec. of State Republican .05 .003 39
Washington 1996 Sec. of State Democratic .24 .07 39
Washington 1996 Treasurer Republican .12 .04 39
Washington 1996 Treasurer Democratic .11 .02 39
Washington 1996 Ins. Comm. Republican .14 .04 39
Washington 1996 Ins. Comm. Democratic .10 .03 39
Washington 1996 Auditor Republican .14 .03 39
Washington 1996 Auditor Democratic .12 .02 39
Washington 1996 Attn. General Republican .13 .04 39
Washington 1996 Attn. General Democratic .006 .001 39
Washington 1996 Comm. of Pub. Land Republican .13 .03 39
Washington 1996 Comm. of Pub. Land Democratic .12 .02 39
Ohio 1992 Senate Republican .04 .03 88
Ohio 1992 Senate Democratic .15 .09 88
Ohio 1994 Senate Republican .04 .04 88
Ohio 1994 Senate Democratic .03 .08 88
Ohio 1994 Governor Republican .13 .04 88
Ohio 1994 Governor Democratic .18 .06 88
results, for example, we nd that the incidence of crossover voting was much dierent in
the governor's primary than it was in the primary voting for the Commissioner of Public
Lands.
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7.3 What has the aggregated electoral data demonstrated?
To conclude, we have shown that there was not a great deal of crossover voting in the
aggregated data we examined using 1992, 1994, and 1996 county{by{county electoral
returns from Ohio and Washington, across a number of dierent primary elections. In
general, we found in the ecological estimates that crossover voting averaged 12% for the
thirteen races we examined.
This analysis of the ecological data, then, leads us to have much more condence in
our hypothesis that the incidence of crossover voting in open and blanket primaries is
not very great. The evidence presented here cross{validates our empirical results using
the exit poll data earlier in this report. Here, we do estimate that the extent of crossover
voting in open and blanket primaries is slightly greater than we found using the exit poll
data from a number of recent presidential primaries across many states. This could be
the result of one of two phenomenon. On one hand, our ecological analysis might be
overestimating the incidence of crossover voting. If that is the case, then the amount
crossover voting in these races is much lower. On the other hand, if our ecological
analysis is correct but the exit poll analysis is incorrect, then the amount of crossover
voting in these races is correct. But in either case, we are very condent, on the basis
of two fundamentally dierent types of empirical evidence and statistical approaches, that
the amount of crossover voting in open and blanket primaries is no higher than the level
we have estimated using the ecological data. Hence, the amount of crossover voting in
open and blanket primaries is relatively slight.
Additionally, the ecological results in this section of our report help to provide answers
to two other important questions. The rst concerns the incidence of crossover voting
in non{presidential primary elections. We have shown above (and just discussed in the
previous paragraph) that we nd little support for the argument that the incidence of
crossover voting is higher in sub{presidential primaries. Also, using the ecological data,
we have found that the incidence of crossover voting in visible state{wide races is not
any greater or lesser than for less prominent state{wide races.
Last, we have provided some evidence here that crossover voting in blanket primaries
is not dramatically higher than in other types of open primary systems. Washington's
blanket primary process is very similar to what might be instituted in California; using the
ecological data we have provided evidence that the blanket primary in Washington does
not produce levels of crossover voting which are much dierent from levels of crossover
voting in other types of open primaries (for example, in Ohio).
8 Conclusion
In this report we have presented an extensive array of data analysis: spanning a variety
of primary election years, dierent states, various types of primary election institutions,
dierent types of data and dierent types of statistical analysis. Our purpose has been
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to determine what the extent of crossover voting is in states with open and blanket
primaries. Additionally, we have also probed into the data further to understand what
motivates individual voters to crossover and vote for candidates of the opposing party |
in particular, whether these voters are doing so for strategic reasons.
We began this report by discussing the relevant academic literature on strategic voting
in political behavior and on crossover voting in primary elections. There we noted that in
this literature the estimated incidence of strategic political behavior, of crossover voting,
and of primary election \raiding", is relatively slight. Additionally, we briey mentioned
some of the problems which we have observed with the empirical analyses in the literature.
We then produced our own extensive analysis of both the publically available survey
data and of some aggregated electoral statistics from Ohio and Washington. Using dif-
ferent statistical approaches to analyzing these dierent databases, we have developed
three conclusions about crossover voting in open and blanket primaries and about the
potential for strategic voter behavior in open and blanket primaries:
1. there is very little crossover voting in general in primary elections in the United
States;
2. the dierence in the amount of crossover voting between states with open primaries
and closed primaries is not substantively large;
3. the amount of strategic behavior on the part of voters in primary elections is small.
We believe that these conclusions shed light on what will happen when California voters
encounter the new open primary system in the future. There is no reason to believe that
the amount of crossover voting will be any dierent in California than in the many cases
we have examined. Also, we believe that our results show that most of the crossover voters
will be motivated to cast ballots for opposing party primary candidates simple because
they prefer those candidates to the candidates oered in their own party's primary, or
they view their own party primary as a foregone conclusion and want the best possible
set of candidates to choose from in the general election. We believe that few California
primary election voters will engage pernicious raiding in the opposing party's primary.
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9 Appendix: County{by{county ecological estimates
of crossover voting
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Table 20: Ecological Crossover Voting Estimates, Washington 1992 and 1994
Estimated Percent of Crossover Voting
1992 Governor 1992 Senate
County Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem.
ADAMS 0.1034 0.1749 0.3291 0.0318
ASOTIN 0.032 0.1994 0.1782 0.0447
BENTON 0.1019 0.1688 0.3735 0.0284
CHELAN 0.1369 0.1451 0.2671 0.0344
CLALLAM 0.1069 0.1604 0.1702 0.0434
CLARK 0.0667 0.1722 0.1322 0.0473
COLUMBIA 0.1124 0.1695 0.3057 0.0311
COWLITZ 0.0179 0.2207 0.1659 0.0409
DOUGLAS 0.1124 0.1493 0.2845 0.0315
FERRY 0.0485 0.1922 0.2107 0.0434
FRANKLIN 0.0955 0.1749 0.3391 0.0308
GARFIELD 0.0689 0.1949 0.3125 0.0396
GRANT 0.1336 0.1405 0.2577 0.0316
GRAYS HARBOR 0.0298 0.1933 0.1322 0.0431
ISLAND 0.1727 0.147 0.1141 0.0414
JEFFERSON 0.1004 0.1652 0.1038 0.0479
KING 0.1362 0.1529 0.0546 0.0464
KITSAP 0.1583 0.1524 0.0867 0.0413
KITTITAS 0.0984 0.1638 0.2219 0.0357
KLICKITAT 0.056 0.1942 0.2405 0.0435
LEWIS 0.1221 0.1587 0.2168 0.0345
LINCOLN 0.098 0.1662 0.2807 0.0303
MASON 0.0879 0.1624 0.1434 0.0452
OKANOGAN 0.0568 0.191 0.2568 0.0446
PACIFIC 0.0183 0.2096 0.1332 0.0426
PEND OREILLE 0.0632 0.187 0.204 0.0444
PIERCE 0.1472 0.1462 0.1029 0.0408
SAN JUAN 0.1462 0.1491 0.0818 0.045
SKAGIT 0.1512 0.1443 0.1064 0.0415
SKAMANIA 0.0465 0.1866 0.1787 0.0453
SNOHOMISH 0.1362 0.1535 0.0962 0.0438
SPOKANE 0.0741 0.177 0.1998 0.0445
STEVENS 0.0995 0.1705 0.2382 0.0362
THURSTON 0.062 0.1852 0.1764 0.0416
WAHKIAKUM 0.0159 0.2478 0.2065 0.0429
WALLA WALLA 0.0614 0.1826 0.2743 0.0408
WHATCOM 0.1599 0.1417 0.0871 0.0417
WHITMAN 0.1007 0.1682 0.198 0.0425
YAKIMA 0.0844 0.1719 0.3479 0.0303
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Table 21: Ecological Crossover Voting Estimates, Washington 1996
Estimated Percent of Crossover Voting
Governor Lt. Governor Sec. of State
County Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem.
ADAMS 0.1267 0.1976 0.2139 0.052 0.0496 0.198
ASOTIN 0.0708 0.2041 0.178 0.0899 0.0515 0.1982
BENTON 0.2602 0.1799 0.1706 0.0845 0.0503 0.1967
CHELAN 0.1255 0.2003 0.2065 0.0567 0.0448 0.2302
CLALLAM 0.1986 0.1859 0.2098 0.0747 0.0471 0.2398
CLARK 0.1805 0.1927 0.1607 0.1132 0.0541 0.1594
COLUMBIA 0.1408 0.1928 0.1829 0.0844 0.0492 0.2025
COWLITZ 0.125 0.1965 0.1545 0.1103 0.0525 0.2099
DOUGLAS 0.1417 0.1986 0.1873 0.0635 0.0456 0.2045
FERRY 0.0945 0.2023 0.154 0.104 0.0508 0.1626
FRANKLIN 0.2239 0.1871 0.1709 0.0822 0.0474 0.1882
GARFIELD 0.1253 0.2 0.2166 0.0604 0.0476 0.228
GRANT 0.1859 0.1881 0.1891 0.0613 0.0485 0.1967
GRAYS HARBOR 0.0918 0.1969 0.184 0.0911 0.0532 0.423
ISLAND 0.202 0.1865 0.2106 0.0732 0.0488 0.2446
JEFFERSON 0.1322 0.1957 0.1825 0.103 0.0497 0.2814
KING 0.1357 0.1924 0.1418 0.1162 0.0517 0.3262
KITSAP 0.139 0.1954 0.2111 0.0848 0.0507 0.3198
KITTITAS 0.1585 0.1908 0.1971 0.0815 0.0494 0.3256
KLICKITAT 0.1802 0.1902 0.1777 0.093 0.0514 0.1382
LEWIS 0.2471 0.1818 0.1984 0.0751 0.0466 0.2101
LINCOLN 0.1846 0.1895 0.171 0.0869 0.0493 0.1654
MASON 0.1069 0.1963 0.3026 0.1021 0.0495 0.3464
OKANOGAN 0.1827 0.1901 0.2072 0.0569 0.0494 0.1568
PACIFIC 0.1342 0.1915 0.1284 0.1026 0.052 0.3685
PEND OREILLE 0.1015 0.2009 0.1446 0.1207 0.0553 0.1827
PIERCE 0.1245 0.1928 0.1442 0.1229 0.0499 0.2979
SAN JUAN 0.2012 0.1931 0.1443 0.1294 0.0491 0.2807
SKAGIT 0.2063 0.1895 0.1767 0.0942 0.0481 0.2537
SKAMANIA 0.0942 0.1983 0.1532 0.1116 0.0566 0.1598
SNOHOMISH 0.192 0.1915 0.1763 0.0905 0.0545 0.286
SPOKANE 0.1569 0.194 0.1509 0.1963 0.0494 0.2133
STEVENS 0.1759 0.1954 0.166 0.0856 0.0478 0.1467
THURSTON 0.1189 0.1938 0.1659 0.0913 0.0509 0.4209
WAHKIAKUM 0.1437 0.1956 0.145 0.1096 0.0503 0.2934
WALLA WALLA 0.1337 0.1934 0.1853 0.0848 0.0511 0.2393
WHATCOM 0.1987 0.1852 0.1484 0.2035 0.0526 0.2444
WHITMAN 0.1413 0.1934 0.1765 0.0856 0.0479 0.2303
YAKIMA 0.2688 0.184 0.174 0.0904 0.0515 0.2028
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Table 22: Ecological Crossover Voting Estimates, Washington 1996
Estimated Percent of Crossover Voting
Treasurer Ins. Commissioner Auditor
County Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem.
ADAMS 0.2009 0.0694 0.189 0.068 0.1473 0.105
ASOTIN 0.1336 0.0971 0.0979 0.1188 0.2005 0.0913
BENTON 0.108 0.1053 0.159 0.0787 0.1153 0.165
CHELAN 0.1396 0.0896 0.2097 0.0578 0.168 0.0784
CLALLAM 0.0962 0.1154 0.1283 0.0983 0.1021 0.1497
CLARK 0.0921 0.1189 0.1399 0.0974 0.1311 0.1089
COLUMBIA 0.1703 0.0862 0.1525 0.0907 0.1365 0.1174
COWLITZ 0.1248 0.1068 0.0895 0.1572 0.1297 0.1235
DOUGLAS 0.1648 0.0807 0.1938 0.06 0.1861 0.0813
FERRY 0.1298 0.0972 0.1705 0.084 0.1147 0.1459
FRANKLIN 0.1197 0.1006 0.1416 0.0843 0.116 0.1236
GARFIELD 0.1129 0.0932 0.1892 0.0786 0.1599 0.0918
GRANT 0.1395 0.0885 0.1762 0.0675 0.1435 0.1174
GRAYS HARBOR 0.1441 0.1173 0.0738 0.1414 0.066 0.1421
ISLAND 0.0678 0.1357 0.1228 0.1018 0.1262 0.1123
JEFFERSON 0.0599 0.1504 0.125 0.1136 0.1194 0.1353
KING 0.0628 0.1394 0.1033 0.1221 0.1402 0.1153
KITSAP 0.0731 0.1268 0.1276 0.1162 0.1582 0.1099
KITTITAS 0.0782 0.1317 0.168 0.0996 0.1361 0.121
KLICKITAT 0.1598 0.0864 0.1092 0.0952 0.1224 0.1246
LEWIS 0.1342 0.0901 0.1232 0.0839 0.1456 0.1014
LINCOLN 0.1554 0.0749 0.1999 0.0606 0.157 0.0868
MASON 0.0887 0.1209 0.117 0.1134 0.0571 0.2089
OKANOGAN 0.0885 0.1286 0.2047 0.0677 0.1638 0.0873
PACIFIC 0.0971 0.126 0.0791 0.1552 0.111 0.1306
PEND OREILLE 0.1127 0.1091 0.1677 0.0931 0.1167 0.1307
PIERCE 0.0637 0.1446 0.0943 0.126 0.2152 0.0968
SAN JUAN 0.0483 0.1608 0.1244 0.1074 0.0899 0.1536
SKAGIT 0.1061 0.1116 0.1203 0.0993 0.1282 0.1359
SKAMANIA 0.0815 0.1232 0.1298 0.1071 0.1187 0.1156
SNOHOMISH 0.0745 0.1293 0.1004 0.1199 0.1333 0.1197
SPOKANE 0.1307 0.0973 0.1893 0.0885 0.1232 0.1319
STEVENS 0.1649 0.0832 0.2229 0.061 0.1436 0.1129
THURSTON 0.1805 0.1 0.088 0.1493 0.1372 0.1137
WAHKIAKUM 0.1405 0.1059 0.0805 0.1635 0.1666 0.1145
WALLA WALLA 0.106 0.117 0.172 0.0844 0.1443 0.1036
WHATCOM 0.1139 0.1104 0.1545 0.0888 0.1401 0.1151
WHITMAN 0.1164 0.1052 0.2217 0.0731 0.143 0.1075
YAKIMA 0.1166 0.0971 0.1645 0.0752 0.1441 0.1247
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Table 23: Ecological Crossover Voting Estimates, Washington 1996
Estimated Percent of Crossover Voting
Attny. General Comm. of Pub. Land
County Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem.
ADAMS 0.1834 0.0038 0.1049 0.1209
ASOTIN 0.0635 0.0088 0.0885 0.152
BENTON 0.2004 0.004 0.1272 0.1043
CHELAN 0.1926 0.0039 0.1995 0.0807
CLALLAM 0.114 0.006 0.132 0.1239
CLARK 0.0557 0.0083 0.1437 0.1134
COLUMBIA 0.1733 0.0041 0.1128 0.1223
COWLITZ 0.0764 0.0073 0.1182 0.1442
DOUGLAS 0.179 0.0042 0.1705 0.0851
FERRY 0.1275 0.0053 0.1402 0.1168
FRANKLIN 0.1541 0.0039 0.1266 0.1101
GARFIELD 0.0946 0.0068 0.1546 0.1021
GRANT 0.151 0.0041 0.1278 0.1077
GRAYS HARBOR 0.1076 0.0054 0.096 0.1819
ISLAND 0.1354 0.0057 0.1479 0.1076
JEFFERSON 0.0919 0.006 0.1402 0.1346
KING 0.1171 0.0068 0.1337 0.1505
KITSAP 0.1207 0.0051 0.1516 0.127
KITTITAS 0.1616 0.0052 0.1363 0.1248
KLICKITAT 0.0955 0.0063 0.1098 0.1257
LEWIS 0.1393 0.0052 0.1322 0.0959
LINCOLN 0.1294 0.0051 0.1283 0.098
MASON 0.1167 0.0057 0.1151 0.1402
OKANOGAN 0.1574 0.0044 0.1054 0.1151
PACIFIC 0.0835 0.0063 0.0924 0.2056
PEND OREILLE 0.1002 0.0065 0.1177 0.1299
PIERCE 0.107 0.007 0.1195 0.1471
SAN JUAN 0.0981 0.0058 0.1711 0.1365
SKAGIT 0.1203 0.0058 0.1591 0.1075
SKAMANIA 0.0692 0.0078 0.1464 0.1215
SNOHOMISH 0.1206 0.0057 0.1165 0.1325
SPOKANE 0.1687 0.0046 0.1201 0.1242
STEVENS 0.1334 0.0051 0.1204 0.1089
THURSTON 0.1417 0.0052 0.1255 0.1521
WAHKIAKUM 0.0752 0.0072 0.1031 0.163
WALLA WALLA 0.1506 0.0043 0.124 0.1145
WHATCOM 0.1394 0.0046 0.201 0.1038
WHITMAN 0.1386 0.0042 0.1089 0.1188
YAKIMA 0.0905 0.0075 0.1242 0.1163
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Table 24: Ecological Crossover Voting Estimates, Ohio 1992 and 1994
Estimated Percent of Crossover Voting
1992 Senate 1994 Senate 1992 Governor
County Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem.
ADAMS 0.0357 0.148 0.143 0.007 0.1919 0.0884
ALLEN 0.0279 0.1973 0.0169 0.0159 0.1688 0.1106
ASHLAND 0.0409 0.0841 0.0169 0.0133 0.1569 0.1605
ASHTABULA 0.0234 0.3681 0.0108 0.0423 0.085 0.2313
ATHEN 0.0611 0.0614 0.0118 0.0423 0.0677 0.2636
AUGLAIZE 0.0344 0.1305 0.0419 0.0091 0.1622 0.1407
BELMONT 0.0159 0.2127 0.0364 0.0242 0.0307 0.2393
BROWN 0.0282 0.1971 0.0528 0.0157 0.1087 0.1851
BUTLER 0.0361 0.1234 0.0138 0.0251 0.1539 0.1409
CARROL 0.0251 0.2384 0.1487 0.0075 0.2059 0.1146
CHAMPAIGN 0.0434 0.0873 0.0173 0.014 0.1689 0.1125
CLARK 0.03 0.1762 0.012 0.0377 0.1261 0.1977
CLERMONT 0.0272 0.1645 0.0179 0.0485 0.1536 0.1326
CLINTON 0.034 0.1 0.0193 0.0329 0.1743 0.0787
COLUMBIANA 0.0421 0.075 0.0103 0.0839 0.097 0.1808
COSHOCTON 0.0373 0.0907 0.0206 0.0142 0.1333 0.187
CRAWFORD 0.0262 0.2011 0.0484 0.01 0.1362 0.1801
CUYAHOGA 0.0209 0.2768 0.0068 0.0386 0.0484 0.3272
DARKE 0.0299 0.2368 0.1855 0.0062 0.2259 0.0962
DEFIANCE 0.0572 0.0287 0.0186 0.0196 0.1564 0.1609
DELAWARE 0.0313 0.1942 0.0464 0.0059 0.1624 0.11
ERIE 0.0297 0.1601 0.0406 0.0149 0.1079 0.2137
FAIRFIELD 0.0274 0.1728 0.0476 0.0098 0.1635 0.1324
FAYETTE 0.0279 0.1745 0.0214 0.0603 0.1662 0.1249
FRANKLIN 0.035 0.0726 0.0157 0.0588 0.1375 0.2003
FULTON 0.0356 0.1431 0.1482 0.0048 0.1743 0.095
GALLIA 0.0741 0.0294 0.0138 0.0962 0.1404 0.1928
GEAUGA 0.0249 0.2152 0.0422 0.014 0.1403 0.2116
GREENE 0.0269 0.1655 0.0182 0.0385 0.1496 0.1663
GUERNSEY 0.0341 0.1116 0.0157 0.0128 0.1265 0.2011
HAMILTON 0.0239 0.3099 0.024 0.0143 0.134 0.1941
HANCOCK 0.0465 0.0663 0.0803 0.0034 0.1812 0.0552
HARDIN 0.0292 0.1696 0.0321 0.0096 0.1748 0.1176
HARRISON 0.0295 0.097 0.0284 0.0205 0.0692 0.2072
HENRY 0.0442 0.031 0.1104 0.0066 0.1704 0.0966
HIGHLAND 0.0337 0.1278 0.0952 0.0075 0.1437 0.177
HOCKING 0.0344 0.096 0.0094 0.0431 0.0813 0.2385
HOLMES 0.0338 0.0844 0.141 0.0077 0.1614 0.1471
HURON 0.0385 0.0975 0.0196 0.0127 0.1365 0.1931
JACKSON 0.0347 0.1257 0.0909 0.0073 0.2129 0.0621
JEFFERSON 0.018 0.3058 0.0439 0.0229 0.0519 0.1918
KNOX 0.0284 0.1903 0.0747 0.0078 0.1683 0.1103
LAKE 0.0201 0.3922 0.0119 0.077 0.1077 0.3427
LAWRENCE 0.1066 0.0356 0.0154 0.0201 0.142 0.1608
LICKING 0.0305 0.0952 0.0165 0.0267 0.1457 0.18
LOGAN 0.0543 0.0338 0.0216 0.035 0.161 0.1042
LORAIN 0.0219 0.3007 0.0228 0.0186 0.0688 0.2756
LUCAS 0.024 0.2963 0.02 0.0161 0.0859 0.2792
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Table 25: Ecological Crossover Voting Estimates, Ohio 1992 and 1994
Estimated Percent of Crossover Voting
1992 Senate 1994 Senate 1992 Governor
County Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem.
MADISON 0.0315 0.1445 0.0193 0.0182 0.1679 0.1044
MAHONING 0.0198 0.1843 0.0387 0.0221 0.0283 0.2367
MARION 0.0298 0.1585 0.0161 0.0368 0.1383 0.1937
MEDIAN 0.0247 0.2533 0.0282 0.0149 0.1322 0.2015
MEIGS 0.0548 0.0252 0.0449 0.0094 0.1685 0.1078
MERCER 0.0252 0.284 0.014 0.067 0.0955 0.2513
MIAMI 0.0398 0.0962 0.0267 0.0094 0.1604 0.1358
MONROE 0.0201 0.2 0.0308 0.0256 0.0265 0.2859
MONTGOMERY 0.028 0.1448 0.0134 0.0963 0.1107 0.2928
MORGAN 0.0486 0.0503 0.0737 0.0064 0.1721 0.1097
MORROW 0.0356 0.0992 0.0153 0.0158 0.1419 0.2003
MUSKINGUM 0.0279 0.144 0.0068 0.7705 0.1518 0.1398
NOBLE 0.0307 0.1432 0.0839 0.0101 0.1362 0.176
OTTAWA 0.0366 0.0615 0.009 0.1473 0.0788 0.3218
PAULDING 0.1123 0.0333 0.0171 0.011 0.1225 0.203
PERRY 0.0248 0.2427 0.1208 0.0118 0.1588 0.1429
PICKAWAY 0.0269 0.2201 0.0143 0.0723 0.1341 0.2059
PIKE 0.0267 0.1639 0.0297 0.0196 0.0907 0.1729
PORTAGE 0.0269 0.1924 0.022 0.0231 0.0669 0.2479
PREBLE 0.0496 0.0629 0.0698 0.0059 0.1677 0.1086
PUTNAM 0.0215 0.2053 0.0143 0.0221 0.1064 0.2317
RICHLAND 0.026 0.1896 0.0145 0.022 0.1306 0.2105
ROSS 0.03 0.1113 0.0813 0.0114 0.1301 0.2076
SANDUSKY 0.0392 0.0777 0.0554 0.0105 0.147 0.1675
SCIOTO 0.023 0.1903 0.0175 0.0155 0.097 0.2158
SENECA 0.0483 0.0597 0.0184 0.0462 0.1229 0.283
SHELBY 0.025 0.2052 0.0115 0.0359 0.1184 0.2242
STARK 0.0343 0.1219 0.0162 0.0155 0.1394 0.1423
SUMMIT 0.0227 0.3206 0.0147 0.0237 0.0692 0.2802
TRUMBULL 0.0181 0.272 0.0088 0.0231 0.0336 0.2887
TUSCARAWAS 0.0181 0.5029 0.0391 0.0179 0.0638 0.1691
UNION 0.0461 0.0739 0.0226 0.0231 0.1725 0.1114
VAN WERT 0.044 0.0698 0.0494 0.0098 0.1684 0.0978
VINTON 0.0367 0.0796 0.0142 0.0325 0.1327 0.2024
WARREN 0.0328 0.1346 0.0165 0.0281 0.1701 0.1116
WASHINGTON 0.2419 0.0255 0.0165 0.0721 0.148 0.1682
WAYNE 0.0263 0.226 0.0471 0.009 0.1547 0.1703
WILLIAMS 0.2045 0.0184 0.0226 0.0218 0.1633 0.118
WOOD 0.045 0.0564 0.0146 0.0277 0.1392 0.1872
WYANDOT 0.046 0.1074 0.0286 0.0082 0.1564 0.1585
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